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This paper empirically investigates the rationality assumption commonly applied in economic 
modeling by exploiting a design difference in the game-show Jeopardy between the US and 
Sweden. In particular we address the assumption of individuals’ capabilities to process complex 
mathematical problems to find optimal strategies. The vital difference is that US contestants are 
given explicit information before they act, while Swedish contestants individually need to calculate 
the same information. Given a rationality assumption of individuals computing optimally, there 
should be no difference in the strategies used. However, in contrast to the rational and focal 
bidding behaviors found in the US, the Swedish players display no optimal behavior. Hence, when 
facing too complex decisions, individuals abandon optimal strategies.    
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 I Introduction 
An enduring controversy in economics regards the conflict between the assumption of 
rationality and the fact that economic agents have limited capacities to process 
information. This type of limited ability to manage information is sometimes referred to as 
bounded rationality.
1 Rationality is often criticized for being too strong of an assumption 
since many maximization problems are quite difficult, which implies that people would not 
be able to carry them out in practice.
2 In rational decision theory individuals are assumed 
to compute their optimal strategy for a given situation, regardless of the extent of 
computational abilities necessary to reach the optimal decision. In theories of bounded 
rationality, on the other hand, agents’ capabilities are assumed to be weaker as they may 
have, for example, too limited computational abilities to solve for the theoretical 
optimum.
3  
In this paper we explore the rationality assumption by taking advantage of a design 
difference in the game-show Jeopardy between the US and Sweden. The vital difference in 
the design is that in the US game contestants are given explicit information before they act, 
while in the Swedish version contestants need to perform calculations to possess the same 
information. Given the rationality assumption, in which case individuals are capable of 
computing optimally, there should be no difference in the strategies used in the two 
designs. Consequently, the difference in the design of the otherwise similar games can be 
used as a kind of natural experiment. Moreover, by using a television game show, we 
                                                           
1 The pioneering works on bounded rationality include, for example, Simon (1955, 1982).  
2 In Aumann (1997) the use of rationality and bounded rationality in various models are overviewed. 3
 obtain the advantage of a natural large-stake setting for decision making.
4 In addition, 
exploring the design difference our paper complements earlier research on rationality by 
using a control and treatment approach in which only one condition is changed – the need 
for individual calculation.  
The game show Jeopardy works as follows. Three participants compete with one 
another in a quiz game. After two successive rounds, in which the players accumulate 
scores according to their ability to answer questions
5 correctly and their ability to signal 
that they want to answer by pushing a button, the contestants enter the Jeopardy final. In 
the final, the three players privately (i.e. hidden from the other players) bid any amount 
they like of their pre-final score on a subject area in which an unknown final question will 
be asked. If a contestant gives the correct answer to the final question, the bid is added to 
that person’s pre-final score. If the answer is incorrect, the bid is subtracted from the pre-
final score. The contestant with the highest final score becomes the “Jeopardy Champion” 
and keeps a sum in the countries’ currency equivalent to the amount of the score (less tax). 
The champion is also invited back to play in a subsequent round of Jeopardy facing new 
                                                                                                                                                                               
3 Kahneman (2003) provides an excellent overview over the psychological foundations of individual 
behavior being limited by bounded rationality. For a discussion on the implications of individual irrationality 
for aggregate economic outcomes see Fehr and Tyran (2005). 
4 The maximum amount a contestant can gain is SEK (Swedish kronor) 283,200 (US $ 1≈ SEK 8) in one 
show and SEK 1,416,000 in five subsequent shows. This requires certain strong restrictions on the evolution 
of the game, however. The highest gain attained from a single show is SEK 88,200 and SEK 179,900 for five 
subsequent shows. The average gain per contestant is SEK 7,151 and the average gain per show is SEK 
13,906 for all Swedish broadcasts, Jeopardy Historia (2003). 
5 A special feature of Jeopardy is that the contestants are given the answer to a question and they have to 
give the correct question to the answer. To avoid confusion, we will use the term correct “answer” to refer to 
the correct question that they give.  4
 contestants.
6 The maximum number of games a winner can play is five successive 
rounds.
7 The first and second runners-up receive non-monetary prizes.
8  
The data on the US Jeopardy is directly based on Metrick (1995), which we 
compare against a sample we obtained from televised broadcasts of the Swedish show. The 
US sample serves as a type of control group with players having explicit information, to be 
compared with our treatment group of players having to compute the same information. 
Adopting this set up we can analyze if players differ in their betting strategy when 
introducing the need for basic calculations in the decision process.  
In both countries’ versions the contestants are told the score levels of the other 
contestants at the end of the first round. The significant difference between the US and the 
Swedish design comes from contestants’ information of the other contestants’ pre-final 
scores after the second round. In the US version this information is explicitly and publicly 
told after the second round is played. In the Swedish version the contestants have to derive 
the same information by adding and subtracting scores of other contestants’ correct and 
incorrect answers while they actively participate in the game. Apart from the information 
aspect, and that the final score is converted into each countries’ currency, the games are 
identical.
9 Given this similarity we may rely on the difference displayed in strategies to 
                                                           
6 If two (or all three) players tie, both (or all) keep their prize money and are invited back to the next show as 
Jeopardy Champions.  
7 The maximum number can in fact exceed five, if the winner is selected for the Jeopardy Champion contest 
that takes place every season. The selected contestants are the three players with the highest winning score 
attained that season. In the data we have one contestant who appears six times.   
8 The values of the non-monetary prizes are approximately the same for both runners-up. 
9 Note that US $ 1 is approximately equal to SEK 8, implying that stakes are higher in the US. However, 
empirical evidence from game-show data shows that the value of the stakes does not affect the probability of 
players using optimal behavior. For example, Tenorio and Cason (2002) find within the game show The 
Price is Right that the size of the stakes does not affect the individuals’ probability to behave rationally. 
Similarly, Healy and Noussair (2004) find no difference when comparing outcomes from The Price is Right 5
 come from the need for Swedish players to derive the same information that is explicitly 
given to US players.  
In essence, we find no evidence of either rational behavior, as that found by 
Metrick, or any other typical behavior of betting strategies. For the pre-final leaders, a 
negligible percentage share adopted strategies which bear similarity to the US sample. 
Similar to Metrick we do not find that runners-up play strategically, but, in contrast to 
Metrick, we neither find that they use typical nor “focal” betting behavior. Our results thus 
suggest that even when faced with a relatively simple problem, in this case addition and 
subtraction, most contestants abandon an optimal strategy and exhibit bounded rationality.  
Related papers are, apart from Metrick (1995), Bennett and Hickman (1993), Berk 
et al (1996), Tenorio and Cason (2002) and Healy and Noussair (2004) who use different 
sub-competitions of the game show The Price is Right to evaluate the rationality 
assumption.
10 In these papers the optimal strategy of a player is derived and the analytical 
predictions are evaluated empirically. It is found that players do not behave rational if the 
problem is hard to solve, which is interpreted in terms of bounded rationality. Our paper 
thus complements these findings but also differs by using a different setting. Moreover, the 
treatment-control group approach we use is similar to that used by Healy and Noussair 
(2004), although they use a laboratory setting. When conducting several treatments that 
simplify the game in the laboratory setting, they analyze the probability of rational 
                                                                                                                                                                               
with prizes ranging from US $ 1,000 up to US $ 60,000, with a laboratory setting of the same game having 
prizes ranging from US $ 2 and US $ 100. However, some laboratory experiments using other settings have 
shown that stakes may matter, see for example Kachlameier and Sheta (1992).  
10 There are several other papers which also use TV-game shows as field experiments but which test for other 
behaviors such as risk aversion or discrimination. See for example Antonovics et al (2005), Beetsma and 
Schotman (2001), Fullencamp, Tenorio and Battalio (2003), Gertner (1993) and Post et al. (2006).  6
 behavior. Similarly, their results suggest that the lack of optimal behavior in The Price is 
Right stems from bounded rationality. 
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 the data is presented. Bidding 
behavior as that found in the US version of Jeopardy is compared with the strategies in our 
Swedish sample in Section 3. Section 4 offers concluding remarks.  
 
II Data 
The Swedish data was collected from video-recorded transmissions of Jeopardy during 
2002.
11 The sample is comprised of 206 shows. In 11 of the shows, the second runner-up 
had a negative (or zero) pre-final score and could thus not play in the final round. Since the 
two remaining players find themselves in a different strategic situation from that of players 
in a three-player game, we exclude these 11 shows from our sample. Altogether, we have 
585 observations.  
Each game can end in different states depending on the number of correct answers 
in the show. These states differ if the pre-final leader is correct, A1=1, or wrong, A1=0, the 
runner-up is correct, A2=1 or wrong, A2=0 and the equivalent, A3=1, or A3=0, for the 
second runner-up. For all 195 games, each state of the game is summarized in Table I. 
Since we use Metrick’s US sample as a control group, the corresponding statistics for the 
US sample are also reported.    
 
                                                           
11 The transmissions are Jeopardy shows from the spring of 2002, the summer of 2002 (video-recorded 
reruns from the fall of 2001), and the fall of 2002. 7
   
Table I - Frequency of the States for Players in First, Second and 
Third Pre-final Positions 
  Swedish sample  US sample 
State
 
(a1 ,a2, a3) 
Number of games  Frequency  Number of games  Frequency 
(1, 1, 1)
   49 0.25  75 0.20 
(1, 1, 0)
   28.5
  0.15  47  0.13 
(1, 0, 1)
   20.5
  0.11 43.5 0.12 
(1, 0, 0)
   25.5
  0.13 45.5 0.12 
(0, 1, 1)  11   0.06  26.5  0.07 
(0, 1, 0)  24.5
  0.12  40  0.11 
(0, 0, 1)  10 0.05  26.5  0.07 
(0, 0, 0)  26 0.13  65 0.18 
Note: The state indicates the number of correct answers in the Jeopardy final. The a1 indicates the 
answer for the pre-final leader, a2 indicates the answer for the runner-up, and finally, a3 indicates the 
answer for the second runner-up. One denotes a correct answer and zero an incorrect answer. 
Observations from tied games are split between the two possible states.  
 
There is a fair amount of variation in the different outcomes in both the US and the 
Swedish games. The frequency that the Swedish pre-final leader is correct is 
(147+85.5+61.5+76.5)/585 = 0.63 with the equivalent for US pre-final leaders being 0.54. 
For the Swedish (US) runners-up the frequency is 0.58 (0.48) and for the second runner-up 
it is 0.46 (0.44). In general, Swedish players have a higher frequency of correct answers to 
the final question than US players.  
 
III Ruling out Best Response 
In order to compare betting strategies between the two game designs, we replicate the 
analysis made by Metrick using our Swedish sample. Metrick foremost uses two different 
subsets of games to study betting strategies. The first subset is comprised of runaway 
games, where the pre-final leaders’ can secure a victory through strategic bidding. The 8
 second subset includes shut-out games where the pre-final leader can make a bid ensuring 
a victory if he (or she) gives the correct answer to the final question.
12  
 
Pre-Final Leader Strategies 
For pre-final leaders in the US Jeopardy, Metrick derives two best responses depending 
upon the amount they are ahead by. First, since the final bid,  1 Y , cannot exceed the 
contestant’s pre-final score,  1 X , then at certain relative positions a pre-final leader can 
guarantee a victory. This applies when the pre-final leader has a pre-final score,  1 X , twice 
as high as the pre-final score of the runner-up,  2 X . In these runaway games the leader can 
be certain of winning as long as his bid does not exceed the difference between the own 
pre-final score and twice the pre-final score of the runner-up, i.e.  2 1 1 2X X Y − ≤ , here 
defined as runaway bids. 
Second, in games where the pre-final leader’s score is not high enough to secure a 
victory, Metrick shows that the pre-final leader has the possibility of making a shut-out 
bid, which is the smallest possible bid that ensures a sole victory if he answers correctly, 
i.e.  1 2 1 2 1 + − = X X Y .
  An example of such a game is when the pre-final leader has 10,000 
and the runner-up has 7,000 (and the third player only has 1,000 and can be ignored), 
whereupon the maximum amount that the runner-up can get is 14,000. The smallest 
                                                           
12 As pointed out by Metrick the game-theoretical equilibria of the Jeopardy final are very complex. Like 
Metrick, we make no attempt to test any game-theoretical predictions. We refer the reader to Metrick (1995) 
where a stylized version of the US Jeopardy can be found.   9





Metrick reports that in the US version of Jeopardy, none of the 110 pre-final leaders in 
runaway games, made a bid larger than the runaway bid threshold. Twenty-four of them 
made a bid exactly equal to, or US $ 1 less than, the runaway bid threshold. That is, all US 
pre-final leaders who had the opportunity secured their winning by basing their strategies 
on the precise score level of the runner-up.  
In our Swedish sample, 64 of the 196 pre-final leaders had the opportunity to make 
runaway bids. The frequencies of runaway bids are summarized in Table II. None of the 
Swedish pre-final leaders made a bid at, or, like US players SEK 1 less than, the runaway 
bid threshold and only 17 made runaway bids. The distribution of bid deviations from the 
runaway bid threshold for pre-final leaders in runaway games is shown in Figure 1. At 
zero, the pre-final leader made a bid exactly at the runaway bid threshold. In the positive 
range the bid is higher than the runaway bid threshold and in the negative range all bids 
are runaway bids. The majority of bids, 73 percent, are in the positive range and among 
these the absolute deviations are high. The average deviation from the runaway bid 
threshold for the Swedish players is SEK 2,584, which is far above 0. In a one sided t test,  
                                                           
13 In Metrick’s analysis it is shown that the focal bid is to ensure a sole victory, not a tie. We hence follow 
Metrick and define a shut out bid as a bid that secures a sole victory. 10
   
Table II – Behavior of Pre-final Leaders in Runaway Games and Shut-
out Games  
RUNAWAY GAMES:   2 1 2X X ≥
  Swedish sample  US sample 
  Obs. Frequency  Obs.  Frequency 
Bid ≤ Runaway bid threshold        
1 2 2 1 1 − − < X X Y   17 0.27  86  0.78 
1 2 2 1 1 − − = X X Y   0 0.00  20  0.18 
2 1 1 2X X Y − =   0 0.00  4  0.04 
Bid > Runaway bid threshold        
2 1 1 2X X Y − >   47 0.73  0  0.00 
Mean Bid Deviation  2,584***     
  (4,644.3)     
Total  64 1.00  110  1.00 
Allowing for a SEK 500 error       
500 2 2 1 1 + − ≤ X X Y   22 0.27    
500 2 2 1 1 + − > X X Y   59 0.73    
Total  81 1.00    
Allowing for a SEK 1,000 error       
1000 2 2 1 1 + − ≤ X X Y   24 0.24    
1000 2 2 1 1 + − > X X Y   76 0.76    
Total  100 1.00    
Swedish sample  US sample  SHUT-OUT GAMES:  2 1 2X X ≤  
Obs. Frequency  Obs.  Frequency 
Bid < Shut-out bid-1        
1 1 2 1 2 1 − + − < X X Y   16 0.12  8  0.03 
1 1 2 1 2 1 − + − = X X Y  (accepting a tie)  2 0.02  26  0.09 
Bid = Shut-out bid        
1 2 1 2 1 + − = X X Y   0 0.00  135  0.48 
Bid > Shut-out bid        
100 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 + + − ≤ < + − X X Y X X   1 0.01  40  0.14 
1 1 2 100 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 + + − ≤ < + + − X X Y X X
 
19 0.14  40  0.14 
000 , 1 1 2 1 2 1 + + − > X X Y   94 0.71  34  0.12 
Mean Bid Deviation  3,218***     
  (3,270.7)     
Total  132 1.00  283  1.00 
Note: Note that in the Swedish sample there are 196 pre-final leaders in 195 games. In one game there is a 
tie between the first player and the runner-up and hence there are two pre-final leaders in this game. 
Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. 11
 we can also reject that the average deviation is zero, or negative, at the 1 percent level.
14 
Hence, in our sample where players had to perform calculations to receive information on 
which they could form their strategy, only 27 percent secured a victory, while 100 percent 




Figure 1.  The distribution of bid deviations from the runaway bid threshold for pre-final 
leaders in runaway games 
 
                                                           
14 If we allow the pre-final leader to make an error of SEK 500 in calculating the runner’s-up score due to the 
need for deriving the information on the other players’ scores, the percentage who made runaway bids does 
not increase. Allowing for an error interval of SEK 1,000 we obtain a percentage of 24. Note that the 
percentage falls, since the number of individuals who made runaway bids increases by 2, but the number of 
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 Shut-out games 
In the games where the pre-final leader’s score is not high enough to secure a 
victory, Metrick finds that the modal bid for pre-final leaders is the shut-out bid and that 
this is made in over half of the games. Metrick defines this as a focal bid. In our sample of 
shut-out games, none of the 132 pre-final leaders chose an exact shut-out bid, and 2 
percent placed a bid within a negative deviation of SEK 1, accepting a tie. The statistics 
are given in Table II. In addition, Metrick finds that 85 percent of the shut-out bids in US 
Jeopardy are played between a perfect shut-out bid and a positive deviation of 1,000. In 
contrast, 17 percent of the Swedish players made a bid within this interval. 
 
Figure 2.   The distribution of bid deviations from the shut-out bid for pre-final leaders 
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  Figure 2 shows the distribution of deviations from a shut-out bid. As in the 
runaway bids’ distribution, we find that the majority of the players bet more than the shut-
out bid and that the absolute deviations from it are large. The average deviation from a 
shutout bid found for the Swedish players is SEK 3,218 which is clearly far from 0. 
Moreover, by a one sample t test, we can reject that the average deviation is equal to zero 
at the 99 percent level. 
 
Analyzing the pre-final leaders’ lack of rationality 
In  runaway games, the pre-final leader can win with certainty given that he uses the 
information on the runner’s-up score. However, only 26 percent who had the possibility in 
our sample behaved rationally and made runaway bids compared to 100 percent in the US 
Jeopardy. In shut-out games, only 2 percent used the modal strategy made by 57 percent of 
the US players. 
When analyzing The Price is Right, Bennett and Hickman (1993), Berk et al. 
(1996), Healy and Noussair (2004), and Tenorio and Cason (2002) find that more 
experienced individuals behave more “rationally” than non-experienced (the learning 
effect in Tenorio and Cason’s is though modest). They interpret this as evidence for the 
presence of bounded rationality. Estimating a logit regression on the probability to do 
runaway bids, we do not find a learning effect in Jeopardy as the coefficient on experience 
on the show, CHAMP, is insignificant, see Table III. A similar regression but on the 
probability to do a bid equal to the shut-out bid or larger, defined as a shut-out interval bid,  14
   
Table III Logit Regression on the probabilities to bid Runaway Bids 
or a Shut-out Bid or higher 
























a  -0.19 -0.050 -0.20  -0.073 
 (0.32)  (0.26)  (0.31)  (0.27) 
RATIO 
b  -10.72*** -5.51*** -11.19***  -5.45*** 
 (3.54)  (2.00)  (3.53)  (1.99) 
A2=1
 c  0.19 -0.42     
 (0.66)  (0.58)     
EASY GAME 
d     0.44  -1.08 
    (0.76)  (0.79) 
CONSTANT 2.58* 6.47*** 2.74** 5.97*** 
 (1.37)  (1.72)  (1.23)  (1.71) 
        
Pr ( > Chi)  0.004 0.020 0.004  0.009 
No of Obs.  64 132 64  132 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
A Only the pre-final leaders with the possibility to do runaway bids are included. Note that the 
Runaway Dummy takes the value 1 for players who played runaway bids.   
B Only the pre-final leaders with the possibility to do a shut-out bid and who did not have the 
possibility to do runaway bids are included. Note that the variable Shut-out Interval Dummy takes the 
value 1 for players who played an exact shut-out bid or higher. Note that none of the players played an 
exact shut-out bid; only 2 players were close with bids yielding a tie.    
a CHAMP is the number of consecutive shows the contestant has participated in. 
b The ratio between X2 and X1. 
c A dummy variable equal to 1 if the runner-up answered correctly in the final and 0 otherwise.  
d A dummy variable equal to 1 if the game is “easy” such that all players answered the final question 
correctly and 0 otherwise.  
 
obtains the same conclusion. We interpret this absence of a learning effect as the players 
finding the problem too complex to solve even when they become more experienced.  
Further, we explore if runaway bids or shut-out interval bids are used more often 
by pre-final leaders when the rational strategy is easier to compute. When the pre-final 
leader is far ahead it is easier to place runaway bids or a shut-out interval bid since the 
interval in which the bid can be placed is larger relative to when the score spread is 15
 smaller. Using the variable RATIO, which is the ratio between  2 X and  1 X , we see that, as 
expected, when the score spread becomes narrower, the less likely pre-final leaders are to 
do runaway bids or shut-out interval bids when given the opportunity.
15  
If the pre-final leader believes the runner-up has a large probability to give the 
correct answer to the final question, he should have large incentives to do a runaway or 
shut-out interval bid since he then expects the runner-up to place a large bid, and thereby 
needs to shut him out in order to win the game. To test this hypothesis two dummy 
variables are created. First, we create a dummy variable A2=1, which is equal to 1 if the 
runner-up answered the final question correctly (and 0 otherwise), corresponding to a 
proxy of the ex ante expectation of the runner-up’s probability to answer correctly.
16 
Second, a dummy variable EASY GAME is created, which is equal to 1 when all 
contestants answered correctly (and 0 otherwise), suggesting the final question to be 
considered easy by the panel. No support however is found for these arguments as the 
coefficients on A2=1 and EASY GAME are insignificant for both strategies.  
 
Is there any other focal betting behavior of pre-final leaders? 
In this section we divert from Metrick’s study and analyze whether players are bidding 
according to some typical or “focal” wagering strategy. Analyzing the distribution of  
                                                           
15 If we contemplate that it is easy to compute the score differences, then strategic play ought to be more 
likely in the games with only two players. In these games the second runner-up performed so bad that the 
score can be ignored. In our 11 two-player games the probability to use runaway bids is 0. For the shut-out 
games the probability to do a shut-out interval bid is 0.11. Hence even when faced with an easier calculation, 
players still do not play according to runaway or shut-out strategies.  
16 There are 5 games with a tie between the runner-up and the second runner-up. Out of these, 3 games had 
the state (1,1,0) or (1,0,1) as one second runner-up was correct and one was incorrect. These games are coded 
as 1 in the A2=1.  16
 deviations from “strategic play”, i.e. deviations from runaway bids and shut-out bids 
shown in Figures 1 and 2, we observe that the distributions are skewed to the right. If 
players were simply making calculation errors, then the new distribution of deviations 
from the runaway bid threshold should be left of zero with the errors symmetrically 
distributed and the distribution of deviations from the shut-out bid should be symmetric 
around zero. The right skewed distributions indicate that players abandon the optimal 
strategy for some other strategy when the need for deriving information by calculation is 
introduced.  
To analyze this further, different bid distributions of the pre-final leaders are 
summarized in Table IV. In the first column we report bid deviations from strategic play. 
In the case of deviations from the runaway bid threshold we observe no modal bid. The 
most common bid deviation is made by three individuals, and is occurring at three 
different bid levels. The second most common bid deviation has a frequency of two with 
eleven different bid levels. In the shut-out games we neither find a modal bid, nor at the 
shut-out bid or at any deviation from it; the most frequent bid deviations were made by 
five players each on three different levels. 
But could there be any other typical betting behavior which may explain the pre-
final leaders’ betting behavior? Could it be so simple that players just bet their score less 
some fixed amount such that other players can expect them to only have the fixed amount 
left if they give the wrong answer?   
 
Table IV – Betting Behavior of the Pre-final Leader in Runaway Games and Shut-out Games  
  Strategic Play  Other focal betting behavior 
  Bid Deviation from the Runaway bid 
threshold or a Shut-out bid  Absolute Difference  The Relative Bid 
 
 






  RW SH  RW  SH  RW  SH 
Mean  2,584.4
***  3,217.7
*** 4,975.0  1,408.1  0.60  0.85 
Standard deviation  (4,644.3) (3,270.7)  (4,513.9)  (2,301.8)  (0.313)  (0.223) 
Skewness  -0.66 0.66  0.77  2.59  -0.33  -2.01 
Kurtosis  3.77 3.28  2.64  9.61  1.80  6.18 
Most common bid  [400, 5,600, 5,800]  [800, 1,000, 2,700]  [600]  [100]  [1]  [1] 
Frequency  3   5   4  19   3  16 
2
nd Most common bid  [11 levels]  [8 levels]  [0, 200]  [0, 500]  [0.77, 0.95]  [0.91] 
Frequency  2   3   3  16  2  4 
Min  -11,200 -3,900 0  0  0.006  0.029 
Median  3,050 2,750  4,100  500  0.652  0.936 
Max  11,700 13,000  17,000  12,000  1  1 
No of Obs  64 132  64  132  64  132 
Note: RW refers to runaway games and SH refers to shut-out games. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 99 level in a t-test of the hypothesis 
that the average deviation from the runaway bid threshold or shut-out bid is equal to zero.    
In the second and third column of Table IV we summarize “other betting 
strategies”. First, if we study the absolute differences between the score and the bid, 
1 1 Y X − , for each of the games respectively, we find an average difference of SEK 4,975 
for the  runaway games and SEK 1,408 for the shut-out games. For both games there is a 
large spread in the absolute differences. Furthermore, the most common absolute 
difference in the runaway games is made by 4 individuals, with a bid yielding a difference 
of 600. Yet, as only 6 percent made such a bid, we cannot argue that this is a focal bid or a 
common strategy. For the shut-out games, the distribution has some absolute differences 
which are more frequent. The most frequent bid yields a difference of 100, played by 
approximately 14 percent while the second most frequent yields a difference of 0 or 500 
played by 12 percent each.  






, we again find no specific bid level which is more common for the runaway 
games, only three individuals applied the most common bid of 100 percent. The 
distribution is also skewed towards high levels of relative bids at around 95 percent and 
up. For the shut-out games, there is a larger likelihood that players wager most of their 
score but not at a typical level. For example, at the exact levels of 90 percent and 95 
percent, there are only 1 and 2 observations respectively. The most common is to wager 
all, which is made by 12 percent.  
In general, there is a difference between pre-final leaders in the runaway games and 
the  shut-out games. There is a higher relative betting in the shut-out games. Using a 19
 nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of the distributions of bets 
between the two types of games, the hypotheses of equal distributions of the absolute 
wagers and the relative bids are both rejected with p-value=0.000. This may come from the 
fact that shut-out games have a lower spread in scores between the pre-final leader and the 
runner-up. Consequently, we do not argue that players necessarily are totally unable to 
keep track of each others scores, instead they may get a sense of being far behind or very 
close, just that they do not base their strategies on the exact score level of the other players. 
This may well explain the difference within the Swedish games.  
 
II. Runner-up strategies 
Metrick analyses the runners’-up strategies in a subset of the shut-out games where the 
pre-final leader and the runner-up can ignore the second runner-up and instead bid against 
each other. Metrick’s objective is to “see whether the players are playing best responses to 
the observed “empirical frequency” of strategies played by their opponents in my sample 
of similar games. I call such bids “empirical-best-responses””, (p. 241).  
As stated above, the focal bid for pre-final leaders in the US Jeopardy was a shut-
out bid. Runners-up would hence assume that the pre-final leader has a high probability to 
play a shut-out bid. Responding to the shut-out bid the runner-up has three options: to play 
Low, High or All.    
The crucial point is that if the pre-final leader plays the shut-out bid but gives the 
wrong answer, then for some relative positions the runner-up can guarantee winning 20
 independent of his answer. This strategy, Low, is played when the bid is equal to or lower 
than a certain threshold,  1 2 3 1 2 2 + − ≤ X X Y . Following the example given above, the pre-
final leader will obtain an amount of 10,000-4,001=5,999 if he is wrong. To obtain a score 
above this (or accepting a tie), irregardless of his final answer, the runner’s-up bid should 
not exceed 1,001 (i.e.  999 , 5 000 , 7 2 ≥ −Y ). This option should be used when the probability 
that the pre-final leader may be incorrect is high and regardless of the contestant’s own 
knowledge of the question. To analyze this, we need two restrictions on the games. First (i) 
1 2 2 3 X X ≥ , otherwise the runner-up does not have a score high enough to secure against 
the shut-out bid. Second, (ii)  3 2 2X X > , such that the third player is so far behind that the 
runner-up can play without jeopardizing his victory with a Low strategy. This subset of 
games is denoted restricted shut-out games. 
The next option is to play High, i.e.  1 2 3 1 2 2 + − > X X Y  and  2 2 X Y < , which is 
played, following the example above, when  1001 2 > Y  and  2 2 X Y < . Note that the runner-
up wins with this bet only if his answer is correct and the pre-final leader is incorrect. 
Consequently, playing High, the runner-up sacrifices a guaranteed victory (given that the 
pre-final leader is wrong) against obtaining a larger amount when he answers correctly. A 
third strategy is to play the All strategy such that  2 2 X Y = .  
  In our data 35 games are restricted shut-out games. First we can note that in 
Metrick’s data 67 percent of the pre-final leaders played within US $ 1 from the shut-out 
bid in these types of games. In our sample of restricted shut-out games the same number is  21
   
Table V – Behavior of Pre-final Leaders and Runners-up  
in “Restricted Shut-out Games”  
Restricted Shut-out Games: (i)  1 2 2 3 X X ≥ , (ii)  3 2 2X X ≥  
Pre-final Leaders  Swedish sample  US sample 
  Obs. Frequency  Obs.  Frequency 
Bid < Shut-out bid -1        
1 2 1 2 X X Y − <   8 0.23  2  0.03 
1 2 1 2 X X Y − =  (accepting a tie)  2   0.06  7  0.09 
Bid = Shut-out bid        
1 2 1 2 1 + − = X X Y   0 0.00 44  0.58 
Shut-out bid < Bid < 1 X         
1 1 1 2 1 2 X Y X X < < + −   20 0.57  22  0.29 
1 1 X Y =   5 0.14  1  0.01 
Total  35 1.00  76  1.00 
Runners-up  Swedish sample  US sample 
  Obs. Frequency  Obs.  Frequency 
LOW        
1 2 2 2 3 X X Y − ≤   5 0.14 18  0.24 
HIGH        
2 2 1 2 2 3 X Y X X < < −   21 0.60  26  0.34 
ALL        
2 2 X Y =   9 0.26 32  0.42 
Total  35 1.00  76  1.00 
Note: Only the restricted games are included. 
 
6 percent, as given in Table V. A great majority of the pre-final leaders in our sample bid 
much higher than the shut-out bid.  
Metrick shows that playing Low is the empirical best response for the runners-up in 
the US sample. He further shows that playing All first-order stochastically dominates High. 
Metrick then finds a puzzle since most of the runners-up play High. In our sample, the pre-
final leaders do not play shut-out bids with any regularity. Further we found no other focal 
pre-final leader bid either. Similarly we do not find any typical response of the runner-up 22
 based on an expectation of the pre-final leader playing a shut-out bid. Only 14 percent 
played within the Low interval and none really close. Instead, the most frequent bids for 
runners-up in our restricted sample are   100 2 2 − = X Y  and  2 2 X Y =  which are each played 
by 25 percent of the runners-up.  
Still, since the pre-final leaders bid between a shut-out bid and the total score, we 
should expect runners-up to play Low with a high frequency. The only strategic alternative 
available to the runner-up to secure a victory is to play Low such that he can win when the 
pre-final leader is wrong. In contrast, there is no strategic play by playing High or All, 
which are the most frequently adopted strategies. Moreover, if the runner-up were to have 
the strategy to play High then it must always be better to play All instead. However, this is 
not what we find in the data as 26 percent play All and 60 percent play High. This is the 
same result as Metrick finds. 
    
Analyzing the runners’-up lack of rationality 
Metrick concludes that “one can safely conclude that, as a group, first-place players are 
having no problem finding their empirical-best-responses” (p.250). Despite this regularity 
of play the US runners-up do not respond correspondingly. Metrick explains that this may 
be caused by the runners-up having a strategic problem which is more difficult to calculate 
than the pre-final leaders. In the case of the Swedish game we should expect it to be even 
more difficult. We perform an analysis similar to that of Metrick to try to explain the 
behavior of the runners-up. We regress a dummy variable, LOW, which is set to 1 if the 
runner-up played Low and 0 otherwise, on different explanatory variables using the  23
 
Table VI – Logit Regression on the Runners-up Probability to Play a Low 
Strategy in “Restricted Shut-out Games” 
  Sweden US Sweden US Sweden US Sweden US 
100 / 2 X   0.034 0.00 0.040 -0.00 0.032 -0.02 0.032 -0.01 
  (1.49) (0.17) (1.60) (0.04) (1.22) (1.15) (1.23) (0.71) 
A2=1
a      -0.86 0.49 -1.31 0.31 -1.24 0.18 
      (0.76) (0.84) (1.02) (0.50) (0.91) (0.28) 
RATIO
 b        14.78*  9.13***  15.04*  8.02** 
          (1.81) (2.54) (1.79) (2.16) 
CHAMP
 c         -0.09 0.46* 
         (0.15)  (1.88) 
CONST.  -4.25**  -1.33  -4.19**  -1.44  -16.01** -7.89*** -16.15** -7.73*** 
  (2.31) (1.37) (2.23) (1.46) (2.22) (2.79) (2.19) (2.62) 
          
Pr( > Chi)  0.12 0.87 0.22 0.68 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.02 
No of Obs.  35 76 35 76 35 76 35 76 
Note: Restricted shut-out games are restricted by: (i) 3*X2>2*X1, (ii) X2>2*X3. LOW refers to the use of a Low 
strategy by the runner-up where LOW=1 if player 2 plays Low and LOW=0 otherwise. Numbers in parentheses 
are asymptotic t statistics.  
a A dummy variable equal to 1 if the runner-up answered correctly in the final and 0 otherwise.   
b The ratio between X2 and X1. 
c CHAMP is the number of consecutive shows the contestant has participated in. 
 
restricted shut-out games. Table VI contains the results from four different logit 
regressions for LOW with Metrick’s regression results included for comparison. In the first 
model we regress LOW on the pre-final score  100 / 2 X  in order to estimate whether 
players did not play Low as a result of them preferring to forego the increased chance of 
winning for a higher pay-off if winning. In none of the four specifications do we find 
support for this claim. The coefficients on  100 / 2 X  are all insignificant which is the same 
result as that found by Metrick.  
If instead behavior is explained by the fact that players have private information on 
their knowledge of the question then they should be less likely to play Low when they are 
more likely to be right. The regression estimates does not show this to be the case. The 24
 coefficient on A2=1 is negative as predicted, but not significant. For US players, Metrick 
finds the coefficient to be positive and insignificant.  
Further the variable CHAMP is included to analyze if the Low strategy is used 
more after learning and with experience of the game. For the US Jeopardy Metrick finds 
that more experienced players have a significantly higher probability to play Low. In our 
games without explicit information we find no support for this. 
Finally, we test whether runners-up are more likely to play Low if they are in a 
game in which the possibility of playing Low is easier to notice and to compute. Metrick 
argues that this would be the case when the pre-final leader and the runner-up are 
relatively close in pre-final scores. We also find support for the claim; the coefficient on 
RATIO is positive and significant.
17 The same pattern is also found in Metrick’s US 
sample.  
 
Is there any other focal betting behavior of runners-up? 
Could it be so simple that runners-up also bet their score less some fixed amount? We do 
find a fairly typical wagering of the runners-up in runaway and shut-out games in terms of 
an absolute difference, see Table VII. First, the most common option is to wager all, which 
is made by 49 of the 199 runners-up, i.e. 25 percent (18 of 67 in runaway games and 31 of 
132 in shut-out games). The second most common bet is to wager all but 100 which is  
                                                           
17 Similarly a t-test yields the same prediction. The 5 games in which the runner-up played Low are much 
tighter games. The average ratio in these games is 0.91 (0.03) while in the other 30 games the ratio is 0.79 
(0.02) with a significant difference at the 99 percent level.    25
   
Table VII – Betting Behavior of the Runners-up in Runaway Games 
and Shut-out Games  
  Other Focal Betting Behavior 
  Absolute Difference   The Relative Bid 
 






  RW SH  RW  SH 
Mean  495.1 642.3  0.88 0.89 
Standard deviation  (1,131.1) (1,186.4) (0.243)  (0.190) 
Skewness  3.28  2.48 -2.86 -2.46 
Kurtosis  12.86 8.79  9.95 8.90 
Most common bid  [0] [0]  [1]  [1] 
Frequency  18 31  18  31 
2
nd Most common bid  [100] [100]  [0.9]  [0.986,  0.983] 
Frequency  14 28  4 3 
Min  0 0  0.0001  0.048 
Median  100 100  0.96  0.976 
Max  5,199 5,900  1  1 
No of Obs  67 132  67  132 
Note: There are 67 runners-up in the runaway games since in 5 games there was a tie between the runner-
up and the second runner-up. RW refers to runaway games and SH refers to shut out games. 
 
made by 21 percent of all runners-up. Hence, both these bids are fairly typical for runners-
up, but are not related to the level of the score of the pre-final leader. 
With relative bids we find that the runners-up wager a fairly high percentage of 
their score with means of 0.88 and 0.89 in the two games. The most common wager is 
equal to 1 and is made by 25 percent. But apart from All being fairly typical there is no 
other exact bid level which could be assumed to be focal.   
Using a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test for the equality of the 
relative wager distribution functions between runners-up in runaway and shut-out games 
the hypothesis is not rejected at a p-value of 0.185. Hence we see no difference between 
runners’-up wagering in the two different settings. Using the same test we cannot reject the 26
 equality of the absolute bidding differences between the two groups either at a p-value of 
0.837. Furthermore a two-sided t test does not reject the equality of the means of relative 
respectively absolute wagering in the two different games.  Overall it appears that runners-
up, even if faced with different strategic set-ups, do not change their strategies between the 
games. Consequently we cannot argue that there is strategic play by the runners-up which 
is contingent on the knowledge of the pre-final leader’s score.    
 
IV Concluding Remarks 
We conclude that assuming perfect individual capacity to calculate optimal strategies is a 
strong assumption of rationality in general. Considering the fairly noncomplex 
mathematical skills, mainly addition, required for the Jeopardy games, the assumption of 
perfect rationality seems even more difficult to justify for more complex economic 
decisions taken in a short time frame. When individuals obtain information they should 
have a larger probability to use optimal strategies, than when lacking this information. 
Given a classical rationality assumption, in which case individuals are capable of 
computing optimally, we should see no difference in the strategies used in the two designs. 
By analyzing the strategies adopted in the two otherwise similar games we obtained a test 
whether the Swedish contestants behaved as those participating in the US show. Our 
results indicated that they did not. Thus, even though the sole difference between the 
groups of players is the need for self-deriving the information which is given to the players 
in the US game, we cannot replicate Metrick’s findings. 27
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